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Reply
CAN RETRIBUTIVISM BE PROGRESSIVE?: A REPLY TO
PROFESSOR GRAY AND JONATHAN HUBER
CHAD FLANDERS*
I. INTRODUCTION
Professor David Gray and Jonathan Huber have done a great ser-
vice in their Response to my Article.1  They have helped me to see the
wrong turns in my argument and the areas in which my argument
needs to be clarified and amplified.  In this brief Reply, I attempt to
respond to some of their concerns.
Gray and Huber’s response is an excellent example of the type of
engagement philosophers of punishment should be making with the
practical realities of punishment in America and in the world.  They
do not simply say what retributivism is and then attempt to justify it.
Rather, they contextualize retributivism in the real world of over-
criminalization, lengthy sentences, and brutal prison conditions.2
They explain how retributivism, rightly understood, can assist us in
thinking about cures for these ills.3  We need more of this kind of
dialogue in contemporary punishment philosophy.  Unfortunately, it
is all too rarely on display.  Philosophy of punishment is, for the most
part, accomplished in a practical vacuum—as if it were no different
than, say, philosophy of mathematics.
In my Article, I emphasized how important it is that philosophies
of punishment orient their theories in the appropriate manner.4  I
meant two things by this claim: First, I meant (or perhaps more im-
plied) that philosophical theories should be attuned to the practical
effects of their theories.  What would happen if they were generally
Copyright  2010 by Chad Flanders.
* Assistant Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law; J.D. 2007, Yale Law
School; Ph.D. 2004, University of Chicago (philosophy).  I thank Justin Tiwald, William
Baude, Christopher Bradley, David Svolba, Maggie Grace, and especially David Gray and
Jonathan Huber.
1. See David Gray & Jonathan Huber, Retributivism for Progressives: A Response to Professor
Flanders, 70 MD. L. REV. 141 (2010).
2. See id. at 157–64.
3. See id. at 152–57.
4. See generally Chad Flanders, Retribution and Reform, 70 MD. L. REV. 87, 111–13
(2010).
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accepted?  How should they be applied?  Second, and more specific to
the realities of American punishment, I argued that philosophers of
punishment should orient their theories toward mitigating the intrin-
sic harshness of punishment.  How could our theories help us make
punishment more humane while still fulfilling the goals and purposes
of punishment?  Philosophers of punishment rarely consider what, if
anything, their philosophies can contribute to the improvement of
punishment practices in the real world and whether their philoso-
phies might be contributing to the harshness of these practices.  This
should change.
In the process of asking these questions, I tentatively offered my
own theory of retributive justice.  Based on the writings of Augustine
and Adam Smith, I suggested that punishment should be basically re-
tributive—it should be justified as a way of giving wrongdoers what
they deserve—but should be mindful of our tendency to punish exces-
sively and treat offenders in worse ways than they deserve.5
I also left many points unsaid or underdeveloped, which Gray
and Huber call my attention to in their response.  First, Gray and Hu-
ber worry that I have not adequately defined what I mean by harsh-
ness and proceed with their own definition of the term.6  Harsh, for
them, is basically a “pass-through” term for disproportionality in pun-
ishment.7  As discussed below, I resist this easy equation of harshness
with disproportionality.8  I am not sure that disproportionality is any
less ambiguous than the ways in which I tried to define harshness.
Second, Gray and Huber develop Kant’s theory of retributivism,
applying their conclusions to certain contemporary features of Ameri-
can harsh justice—overcriminalization, sentencing, and brutal prison
conditions.9  I did not spend much time in my Article discussing Kant,
except to the extent that he has influenced modern punishment theo-
rists such as Professors Herbert Morris and Jeffrie Murphy.10  Gray
and Huber are correct to focus my attention on Kant.  But, are Gray
and Huber correct that Kant gives us a “retributivism for
progressives”?
I am skeptical.  Kant was quite insistent on the death penalty and
no fan of mercy (among other things).11  He was, along many dimen-
5. See id. at 124–33.
6. See Gray & Huber, supra note 1, at 146–52. R
7. Id. at 150.
8. See infra Part II.
9. See Gray & Huber, supra note 1, at 152–64. R
10. See Flanders, supra note 4, at 115–16, 119. R
11. IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 102 (John Ladd trans.,
Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1965) (1797) (“If . . . he has committed a murder, he must die.”).
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sions, harsh.  This does not, of course, mean that we cannot adapt
Kant’s theory and apply it to our own nonharsh ends.  But, does Kant
give us much guidance here?  Gray and Huber invoke Kant in defense
of drug decriminalization,12 but Kant’s theory does not necessarily
support this result.  We may be better off defending decriminalization
in terms of privacy and autonomy rights rather than in terms of pun-
ishment theory.13  I also worry that Kant’s theory as applied to sen-
tencing and prison conditions will simply be too indeterminate to be
of use.  But, I hope I am wrong in that conclusion.
II. WHAT, EXACTLY, IS HARSHNESS?
Gray and Huber first take me (and James Whitman, on whom I
rely) to task for not being very clear about what, exactly, is “harsh”
about American criminal justice.14  Following Whitman, I isolated
three factors.  First, I claimed that American justice is harsh because it
is inflexible—it gives judges and other officials little discretion to de-
part from mandatory or fixed sentences.15  Second, American justice
is harsh because sentences are too long by almost any reasonable mea-
sure.16  Third, American justice is harsh because prison conditions are
inhumane.17  Gray and Huber are correct that my canvassing of these
three points was more impressionistic than thorough.
This was largely because I did not want to belabor the obvious—
namely, that American criminal justice and prison conditions are in-
tolerably cruel, or as Gray and Huber put it, “unpleasant in almost
every respect.”18  Gray and Huber helpfully marshal statistics about
the number of individuals in prison, the length of sentences, and the
quality of life in prisons, objectively proving the harshness I largely
assumed in my Article.19
But, harshness may also simply not be reducible to one metric or
to one set of statistics.  This impossibility does not necessarily make
harshness subjective, although it does make a definition harder to pin
12. See Gray & Huber, supra note 1, at 158–60. R
13. See, e.g., Dana Graham, Comment, Decriminalization of Marijuana: An Analysis of the
Laws in the United States and the Netherlands and Suggestions for Reform, 23 LOY. L.A. INT’L &
COMP. L. REV. 297, 307 (2001) (“[An] emphasis on personal autonomy and privacy is possi-
bly the main reason why the Netherlands does not treat personal possession of marijuana
as a serious crime.”).
14. See Gray & Huber, supra note 1, at 146–52. R
15. See Flanders, supra note 4, at 92–93. R
16. See id. at 93–95.
17. See id. at 95–96.
18. Gray & Huber, supra note 1, at 146. R
19. Id. at 141–43.
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down.  Whitman seems correct in claiming that our own harshness
becomes evident by observing how other countries treat their prison-
ers and how they sentence.20  We can also reflect more abstractly on
how we ought to treat our fellow citizens when they have committed a
crime.  It is true, as Gray and Huber quote Whitman, that “[w]hat
counts as ‘harsh’ depends on the sensibilities and structures of a given
society.”21  Even within our own “sensibilities and structures,” how-
ever, we can still ask ourselves whether we are treating prisoners hu-
manely or harshly.  We are, in fact, failing miserably.  The main
problem is that, most of the time, we prefer to avert our eyes from the
way we treat prisoners.22
After rejecting several possibilities, Gray and Huber define harsh-
ness as “disproportionate punishment.”23  I agree that this is one as-
pect of harshness (and said as much in my original Article).
Disproportionate punishment, however, is not the only aspect, and it
too has an elusive meaning.  Disproportionality alone cannot fully
capture the badness of brutal prison conditions or sadistic prison war-
dens.  Moreover, our initial response to the official toleration of
prison rape is not distress over its disproportionality but disgust at its
inhumanity.  Finally, disproportionality alone does not enable us to
criticize inflexible sentencing regimes.24
Disproportionality works best as support for the claim that
sentences are too long—that they are disproportionate to the crimes
committed.25  Even here, we might worry that the bare idea of propor-
tionality will not offer much precision: What is a disproportionate sen-
tence for theft, for rape, or for kidnapping?26  Viewing punishments
as simply excessive, rather than as disproportionate, may free us some-
what from the burden of specifying just how excessive punishments
actually are.  We can simply state that, by any measure, prison
sentences in America are too long.
20. See generally James Q. Whitman, The Comparative Study of Criminal Punishment, 1 ANN.
REV. L. SOC. SCI. 17 (2005).
21. See Gray & Huber, supra note 1, at 147 (quoting JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE: R
CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT AND THE WIDENING DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE 32 (2003))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
22. For a good, recent statement of the awful state of punishment in America, see
Rough Justice in America: Too Many Laws, Too Many Prisoners, ECONOMIST, July 24, 2010, at 33.
23. Gray & Huber, supra note 1, at 150. R
24. Proportionality seems to require fixed and inflexible punishments—that is, once
we have figured out what punishments are proportional.
25. See, e.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977) (“[D]eath is indeed a dispro-
portionate penalty for the crime of raping an adult woman.”).
26. For a discussion on my approach to solving this puzzle, see infra Part III.
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In the end, vagueness in the definition of harshness is not a prob-
lem.  Harshness covers a multitude of sins, which is exactly why it
works.  Punishments can be too long, too cruel, too inflexible, or they
can be all these things at once (as they often are, in America).  It is
less important that we identify a precise definition of harsh than we
construct theories that can at least address some of the broad harsh-
ness of American criminal justice.  Of course, Gray and Huber also do
this,27 and I now turn to this part of their response.
III. CAN RETRIBUTIVISM BE PROGRESSIVE?
Gray and Huber find ground for a progressive retributivism in
Kant, building, in part, on Gray’s earlier work28 but adding some im-
portant nuance and detail.29  I am worried about using Kant as a pro-
gressive resource.  The real Kant, the historical Kant, was famously
rigoristic—allowing no exceptions to moral rules, not a lie to the mur-
derer at the door,30or, to our present concern, not allowing a guilty
murderer to escape the death penalty.31  Even if it served no social
purpose, Kant believed that the murderer must be executed; if he was
not, justice was thrown in doubt.32  Kant was the inflexible punisher
par excellence.33
Gray and Huber illustrate Kant’s theory using the example of
theft: The thief has, by his action, made everyone’s property insecure,
and under the principle of retribution, he deserves to have his own
property made insecure.34  Gray and Huber conspicuously do not
27. See Gray & Huber, supra note 1, at 158–64. R
28. See David Gray, Punishment as Suffering, 64 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (on
file with the Maryland Law Review).
29. See Gray & Huber, supra note 1, at 152–57. R
30. IMMANUEL KANT, On a Supposed Right to Lie from Philanthropy, in PRACTICAL PHILOSO-
PHY 611 (Mary J. Gregor ed. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1996) (1797).
31. See supra note 11. R
32. IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 106 (Mary Gregor ed. & trans., Cam-
bridge Univ. Press 1996) (1797) [hereinafter KANT, METAPHYSICS OF MORALS].  According
to Kant:
Even if a civil society were to be dissolved by the consent of all its members (e.g.,
if a people inhabiting an island decided to separate and disperse throughout the
world), the last murderer remaining in prison would first have to be executed, so
that each has done to him what his deeds deserve and blood guilt does not cling
to the people for not having insisted upon this punishment; for otherwise the
people can be regarded as collaborators in this public violation of justice.).
Id.
33. Kant only allows for clemency where the criminal has committed an offense against
the sovereign himself because it allows him to “show the splendor of his majesty.” Id. at
109–10.
34. Gray & Huber, supra note 1, at 154. R
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mention Kant’s analysis of rape: The person who rapes deserves him-
self to be castrated.35  Kant does not seem a reliable guide if we seek to
avoid inhumane treatment of offenders.
But, of course, great philosophers are not only great for what they
say but also for what can be done with what they say.  Gray and Huber
update Kant in some provocative and progressive ways.  For example,
they use Kant to defend drug decriminalization and to condemn
many punishments as disproportionate.36  I want to remark briefly on
both of these points.
Gray and Huber maintain that Kantian theory does not support
imprisonment for many regulatory offenses, which make up a large
part of our criminal law.37  They further, and provocatively, apply a
similar type of reasoning to drug offenses.38  There is nothing in drug
use, Gray and Huber explain, that is incompatible with the freedom of
all.39  The same claim, however, could not be made of murder and
theft, which do threaten the liberties of others.  So, according to
Kant’s theory, punishment (as opposed to health and safety measures
to manage and to treat drug users) is not permissible for drug
offenses.40
Modern day Kantians have not taken the same route as Gray and
Huber, and it is not hard to see why.  When an individual breaks the
law, he commits at least one moral wrong—he has broken the law.  Of
course, he may also have committed an additional moral wrong given
the nature of his underlying crime.  For instance, the murderer has
done something morally wrong in itself (an unjustified killing) and
has also committed the moral wrong of breaking the law.  With regula-
tory offenses, in contrast, we may only have the wrong of breaking the
law.  This is also, arguably, the case with drug offenses.
These types of offenses, however, are still wrongs against the state.
Once the state has made an act illegal, the state should have the right
to punish one who acts illegally.  The offender has harmed all of us by
making the legal order unstable.  This is true whether the crime is
35. KANT, METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra note 32, at 130 (explaining that “[t]he pun- R
ishment for rape and pederasty is castration”).  To be fair, Kant concedes that it would
violate the rapist’s dignity to give him what he really deserves—namely, to be raped him-
self.  We might also mention, however, that chemical castration (to put it delicately) was
not an option in Kant’s day.
36. See Gray & Huber, supra note 1, at 158–60. R
37. See id. at 156.
38. See id. at 158–60.
39. See id. at 158–59.
40. See id. at 158.
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murder or abandoning your refrigerator.41  Simply breaking the law,
for Kant, involved a contradiction.  You cannot will that you be al-
lowed to break the law while no one else can.42  Indeed, Kant was
clear that even an unjust legal order required obedience.43  Thus,
breaking the law is immoral and deserves punishment—a point that
applies to drug and regulatory offenses as much as it does to murder.
This is justification enough for punishment for those crimes from a
retributive point of view.
Now, we might think that some things should not be crimes in
the first place.  But, this is a different sort of argument.  It is not an
argument based in the philosophy of punishment.  Rather, it is one
based in the philosophy of freedom.44  We cannot argue from princi-
ples of retributive justice alone about what things are properly crimes
or are not.  Kant was clear that, from a punishment perspective, a vio-
lation of the law—whatever the law happens to be—justified retribu-
tive punishment against the lawbreaker.  What things should properly
be made illegal is then a separate inquiry.
This still leaves Gray and Huber’s points about sentencing.45  It
may be that even if we can punish for merely breaking the law, those
punishments should be rather slight.  This seems right and is reflected
in our scheme of regulatory infractions.  Many regulatory infractions
carry only a fine and very rarely involve jail time.46  Gray and Huber’s
Kantian story helps us better understand this familiar reality.
Can we move much past this relatively uncontroversial claim?
Here is where the Kantian formula for proportionality would appear
to enter.  Say we want to discover the proper punishment for theft.
Gray and Huber quote Kant as stating that ‘“[w]hoever steals makes
the property of everyone else insecure and therefore deprives himself
41. MO. REV. STAT. § 577.100 (West 2003) (criminalizing abandonment of an airtight
icebox).
42. KANT, METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra note 32, at 97 (explaining how disobedience R
to the law is “self-contradictory”).
43. Id. at 96–97 (stating that people have a duty to obey “even what is held to be an
unbearable abuse of supreme authority”).
44. If we wanted to make arguments for decriminalizing drugs or for removing many
regulatory offenses, we might simply want to make those arguments directly rather than
relying on Kantian arguments about whether something can be universalized without con-
tradiction. See, e.g., Gray & Huber, supra note 1, at 154 (citing KANT, METAPHYSICS OF R
MORALS, supra note 32, at 18). For instance, we might say that we have autonomy or pri- R
vacy rights that are infringed by drug laws. See, e.g., Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 511
(Alaska 1975) (explaining that “possession of marijuana by adults at home for personal
use” is protected under the privacy clause of the Alaska constitution).
45. See Gray & Huber, supra note 1, at 160–64. R
46. See generally Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600 (1994) (noting that public of-
fenses which do not require scienter impose lighter punishment).
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(by the principle of retribution) of security in any possible prop-
erty.’”47  But, what does this mean in terms of punishment?  Do we
steal from the thief?  If so, how much of his property should we take?
(And what if he has no property?)
More generally, can Kant tell us how to fix the appropriate term
of years for any given offense?  Beyond instructing that the propor-
tional punishment for murder is the death penalty, Kant is less than
helpful.48  We can say that the person who steals should be deprived
of his security in property, but what does this mean in terms of days or
months or years served?  Gray and Huber are reduced to stating that
some sentences “appear” to be disproportionate to their offenses,49
but we lack any way of asserting that they actually are disproportionate
in terms of being too long by X number of years.
Of course, such precision might be too much to ask of any theory,
but I wonder whether reading Kant will advance us any further than
simply suggesting that our sentences are excessive along any dimen-
sion—retributive, deterrent, or rehabilitative.  There is a potentially
large range of appropriate sentences for each crime: We can exclude
sentences that are too long or too short, but what should we do about
the wide variation in the middle?  In my Article, I suggested that
rather than trying to find the right number—or some formula for fix-
ing sentences—we should instead think institutionally.50  Who is in
the best position to make sentencing decisions?  And how do we pre-
vent those who do sentence from considering irrelevant factors or
47. Gray & Huber, supra note 1, at 155 (quoting KANT, METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra R
note 32, at 106)). R
48. See supra note 11; see also KANT, METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra note 32, at 130 (“For R
the only time a criminal cannot complain that a wrong is done him is when he brings his
misdeed back upon himself, and what is done to him in accordance with penal law is what
he has perpetrated on others, if not in terms of its letter at least in terms of its spirit.”
(footnote omitted)).
49. See Gray & Huber, supra note 1, at 162 (“Enhanced sentences justified by expan- R
sions of conspiracy liability also result in punishments that appear to be harsh by retribu-
tive standards.”).
50. See Flanders, supra note 4, at 109, 130.  As John Finnis has emphasized, punishment R
presents an example of “the need for determinatio, a process of choosing freely from a range
of reasonable options none of which is simply rationally superior to the others.”  John
Finnis, Retribution: Punishment’s Formative Aim, 44 AM. J. JURIS. 91, 103 (1999).  The problem
with discretion is not in how to eliminate it (in this case it cannot be eliminated).  Rather,
the problems are in determining who is in the best position to wield discretionary power
and in ensuring that this discretionary power is wielded responsibly.
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from being too harsh in their sentencing?  By contrast, the quest for
an objective notion of proportionality seems nearly hopeless.51
IV. CONCLUSION
I have spent most of this Reply disagreeing with Gray and Huber’s
claims: First about harshness, and second about the uses of Kant for
retributive theory.  I think harshness, although vague, is still a useful
term to describe American punishment practices.  In addition, I worry
that Kant may be less helpful, and possibly even harmful, in thinking
about how we can become less harsh.
These disagreements, however, are small in comparison to the
deep agreement between us.  We agree in spirit if not in letter.  My
Article was mostly about articulating the philosophy of punishment in
the right spirit, as being geared toward the real and pressing problem
of American harsh justice.  I wanted us, qua philosophers of punish-
ment, to think twice about theorizing without considering the real
world effects of our theories.  Some theories are too abstract.  Even
worse, some theories are abstract and potentially harmful.  They lead
us to philosophize about punishment in the wrong spirit.
Gray and Huber’s response is philosophy of punishment under-
taken in the right spirit.  Gray and Huber focus our attention on pun-
ishment theory’s pressing practical interest in changing the status quo
for the better.  If our exchange encourages others to see the impor-
tant obligation punishment theory has to real reform, then this has
been one step toward making that needed reform real.
51. For my early effort to make this point, see Chad Flanders, Shame and the Meanings of
Punishment, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 630–31 (2006) (noting difficulty of finding any “absolute”
proportionality in figuring appropriate punishments).
